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Abstract 
 
Multi-agency emergency response requires effective 
communication and collaboration for building and 
maintaining a common operational picture. Full-scale 
exercises are shown to be effective for learning, and for 
training the collaborative skills needed. This paper 
presents a methodology for the analysis of real-time 
communication for building the common operational 
picture, using audio-logs. The analysis of the audio-logs 
provides insights for both practitioners and researchers 
in the emergency management domain concerning the 
dynamics of inter-agency collaboration and information 
exchanges when responding to emergencies. Coding 
and categorizing of audio-log-based information 
exchanges among multi-agency stakeholders were 
applied based on a full-scale emergency exercise on 
multiple terror actions. The results show that the 
methodology can contribute to analyzing the 
development of a common operational picture, 
supplementing existing methods for evaluation of full-
scale emergency exercises and real events.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In large scale emergency events involving multi-
agency collaboration several factors need to be in place, 
i.e. common communication tools, the establishment of 
a common operational picture (COP), mutual trust and 
respect, as well as awareness about own and other 
Emergency Management Services’ (EMS) 
responsibilities and tasks. To make expedient use of 
those factors, it is important that the emergency 
stakeholders possess the knowledge of the systems and 
capabilities to use them to solve the tasks [1]. Yet, 
without the key information concerning the situation, 
cooperation is not enough to make a response operation 
more efficient [2]. Such operations typically deal with 
heterogeneous information needs, processes/ structures, 
goals, resources, technology and other features within 
the involved organizations [3]. Despite these 
heterogeneities, the key goal for all actors is to 
collaborate to save lives and limit damage.  
Worldwide, mass causality incidents have a huge 
impact on communities, both in terms of human 
suffering and the economy. One example is the terror 
attacks in Norway on 22nd of July 2011, where 77 
people, mostly very young, were killed and 260 people 
were injured in two planned attacks. The commission-
report concluded that there were several blameworthy 
conditions and a significant need for changes. For 
instance, the report stated that some of the failures were 
due to impaired ability to recognize risk and that 
learning from exercises had been deficient, furthermore, 
the establishment of situational awareness (SA) and a 
COP during the response operation was insufficient [4]. 
Learning from previous decisions, actions and incidents 
must be practiced and evaluated through full-scale regional 
exercises to enhance the EMS’ capabilities to handle mass 
causality incident operations [5].  
Evaluation is a method for generating new knowledge 
and understanding in a certain setting, and by utilizing 
the results of the evaluation, the consequences can be 
changed in the affected organizations [6] As Weiss [7] 
states: «the overall aim of evaluations is to assist people 
and organizations to improve their plans, policies and 
practices». In multi-agency emergency management, 
the different involved actors are aiming to achieve a 
collective perception, but they are likely to transfer their 
own vision to the situation, based on their own 
professional standpoint [8]. Therefore, in an exercise 
involving several decision-makers, effective evaluation 
is an issue because different decision-makers operate 
with different understanding and knowledge about the 
situation [9]. This reflects the difficulty of objective 
evaluation of full-scale exercises [10] and the need for 
an efficient method for evaluation is essential to be able 
to defend the resource-and economic aspect of large 
exercises. The visualization of information in most 
evaluations relies on textual sources (such as reports) 
and interviews. The lack of real-time communication 
makes it difficult to gain the detailed information being 
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exchanged, and access to this material will contribute to 
strengthen the evaluation`s results.  
This paper extending previous findings [11], and 
aims to provide an analysis methodology for evaluating 
the COP established during a full-scale exercise, 
through post hoc analysis of the inter-agency 
communication using audio-logs. One of the advantages 
of this proposed approach is that the individual actor`s 
narrative (which is likely to be affected by their own 
view) can be compared to the actual communication 
during the event, to inform the post even debriefing. 
Thus, the method can provide an important contribution 
to existing evaluation methods.   This approach offers a 
foundation for common discussion on important 
features and the outcome of the interactions. Moreover, 
the proposed categorization framework of the 
exchanged information provides the opportunity to 
evaluate the COP. 
To demonstrate the usefulness of the approach, we 
conducted a temporal analysis of a full-scale exercise 
involving a multiple terror attack scenario. The analysis 
shows the changes in the multi-agency interactions and 
information being exchanged from time to time, 
reflecting the communication patterns, interactions and 
the importance of particular communications in 
different stages of the event. By investigating 
communication patterns and bottlenecks, the potential 
for improvement is possible [12].  
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
 
Situational Awareness: Disaster management is 
an active process over time, which gradually changes as 
the situation develops, and the signals change [13]. 
Disaster response systems must be able to handle the 
complexity of the emergency environment and include 
the fact that a variety of agencies will be involved in 
making complex decisions during the operation [14]. 
During these emergency operations, situational 
awareness (SA) plays a critical role due to performance 
and error prevention [15]. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish SA during emergency management. The 
theory of SA is the foundation for a large number of 
studies on dynamic human decision-making in several 
domains [e.g. 16, 17-19]. With evolving technology 
support humans are able to act more effectively in 
decision-making when operating in dynamic systems 
[20]. SA in multi-agency operations includes complex 
cognitive components. While analysis of the audio-log 
from the response operation does not cover the actors’ 
cognitive processes, the communication can reveal the 
state of SA in different stages of the operation. 
Moreover, SA is an important component for all actors 
involved for both creating and maintaining a COP (see 
figure 1). The SA theory is used by a number of other 
studies, for example as a framework for defining 
emergency stages by taking the available information 
into account [21] and how individuals develop different 
levels of SA by conducting a SA requirements - and 
resource analysis [22]. 
Endsley [23] defines three different levels of SA:(1) 
perceiving the elements in the environment, (2) 
comprehending the current situation, and (3) projecting 
the future status of the situation. The first level is crucial 
for the actor to achieve SA because it involves the 
critical cues/information needs, and further, it forms the 
basis for the construction of the two next levels. The 
actors` achievement of SA level 2 and 3 consists of 
important information to share, for instance, level 2 is 
the foundation for actions, and level 3 for action 
planning. This is also related to the operation`s goals, 
and in multi-agency emergency operations, such as in 
mass causality incidents, the actors interact 
interdependently toward a common goal [15]. The 
involved agencies must collaborate to reach the shared 
goals, and the critical information should not been kept 
individually or internally in the agencies [24]. The case 
to be presented in this paper clearly demonstrates the 
importance of SA within the agencies for contributing 
to a COP among all the involved stakeholders (figure 1). 
Without a sufficient SA the contribution to a COP will 
be incomplete.   
Common Operational Picture: Collaboration and 
coordination are crucial factors for success in crisis 
management [e.g. 3, 25, 26]. Several studies and 
retrospective analysis point to challenges related to 
coordination in multi-agency emergency management 
[27-31]. Information sharing is a significant component 
in the collaborating process and the reliability of the 
shared information is crucial in intensive operations 
[12]. There are several bottlenecks due to information 
sharing among multiple agencies in mass causality 
incidents, and a major reason seems to be the nature of 
the incident itself. Several studies point to the 
complexity, the dynamics and the unpredictable aspect 
Figure 1 Agencies’ SA and communication of 
shared elements (SE) to create a COP 
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of the environment [e.g. 20, 28] where collaboration 
needs to be unfolded.  
The EMS needs a collection of relevant and verified 
information from different sources in the environment, 
and further to share this with the collaborating EMS. 
This includes both static and dynamic features of the 
environment [32], such as location, incident type, 
number of victims and threats.  
The different agencies involved, representing 
different professional disciplines, will have some SA 
requirements that are internal and specific for the 
agency`s goal (see figure 1). However, in collaboration 
processes, many of their actions will be interdependent 
and they will have shared goals with the other involved 
agencies and thus shared SA requirements [15]. In 
communication that aims to achieve a COP, it is 
important for all the involved parties to understand 
information not only based on their own view but also 
what is crucial for the collaborating agencies. 
 This requires knowledge of each other’s key 
elements, such as information needs, goals, 
expectations, responsibilities, resources, capabilities 
and procedures to achieve effective cooperation [33, 
34]. Agencies with different tasks and goals might 
emphasize the data that mostly concern themselves [35], 
and absence of knowledge on these key elements can 
create an information overload or lack of information 
caused by ignorance or inability to determine necessary 
information to share [3].  
In addition, the agencies utilize different 
terminologies [36]. Using different terminologies 
among the agencies addressing the same concepts and 
events can hinder the establishment of the COP. 
Heterogeneous awareness about different terms is a 
problem among emergency stakeholders [37]. An 
overview of crisis vocabularies are not always present, 
and when they are, they are distributed on diverse 
repositories designed differently and not harmonized 
across agencies [38]. It seems to be necessary with more 
coordination on terminology management [39] and the 
task-critical information must be exchanged by using 
harmonized terminology to build and maintain a COP.   
The majority of the emergency management 
information systems facilitate only information sharing 
and do not emphasize the collaboration process [21]. 
The fact that the actors have different perceptions of 
information [40] implies that even if the information 
system provides a solid foundation for communication 
and information sharing, the lack of a standardized 
framework [21] for the collaboration process may result 
in ineffective processes for communication and 
cooperation.  
The characteristics of a COP are relevant operational 
information across agencies [41]. Thus, to create a COP 
the communication must be structured to provide the 
involved agencies with accurate, timely and prompt 
information. The time aspect concerns several elements; 
sharing information in the least possible time because of 
the time-paced situation [42], sharing information in the 
different stages of the operation, and the continuous 
communication process for the involved actors` 
maintenance of a COP. Several studies underpin the 
importance of this upkeeping of a COP, and that it is a 
necessary component for the emergency operation to be 
effective [e.g. 41, 43, 44].  
One must consider that complete SA is not possible 
in any emergency operation [40], but each agency 
involved will focus on collecting the task-oriented 
critical cues that provide the highest possible SA. 
Furthermore, in multi-agency operations, the individual 
agencies have a responsibility to create a COP together 
with the collaborative agencies. In addition to common 
SA elements, the COP is an accumulation of important 
information elements that are selected in different 
categories such as the different organizational actions, 
prognosis and perceptions [43].  
The COP can be communicated by technology such 
as Geographical information systems (GIS), by 
providing a display of relevant operational information, 
such as positions, infrastructure and different resources 
using custom symbols [41]. Many EMS do not use the 
same GIS interface and only operate with tools 
supporting verbal communication in the collaboration 
process. Regardless, the communication of shared 
elements must be conducted in an appropriate way, 
using a standardized framework, definitions and 
common terminology [12] and symbols for successfully 
creating a COP (see figure 1).   
Building a COP among multi-agencies is a skill that 
is focused as an important part of exercises in 
emergency management, and the inclusion of 
collaborative elements offer participants perceived 
learning [45]. Conducting a full-scale exercise is 
demanding both in terms of costs and resources 
required. Several factors need to be considered, such as 
the so-called “infallibility behavior” that refers to the 
participants` effort to do their absolute best to make an 
impression. Nevertheless, if a culture for learning exists, 
the participants are willing to reveal their weaknesses 
for the learning outcome`s sake [25]. The outcomes after 
emergency management exercises offer useful learning 
for the participants [46]. However, a study of three 
collaboration exercises involving the police, fire and 
ambulance services conducted in Sweden [47] revealed 
that the perceived impact on actual emergency work was 
moderate. The learning outcome did not include the 
collaborating EMS` way of communication and 
prioritizing, thus the collaboration elements in exercises 
should be strengthened. An important step in this would 
be a common understanding among the involved 
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agencies concerning basic concepts, structures and 
processes, thus knowing each other`s operational modes 
[12].  
Based on the literature reviewed earlier, the following 
table summarizes important features for EMS to maintain 
a COP in complex emergency operations: 
 
Table 1  Important features for a COP 
 
1 
Creation and maintenance of different levels of SA 
within the involved agencies. 
 
2 
Knowledge of each other`s operational modus, such 
as information needs, goals, capabilities, processes 
and resources. 
 
3 
Effective and time-specific communication of 
important static and dynamic environmental 
features, shared elements and common critical cues. 
 
4 
Harmonized terminology, both in vocabulary and 
software symbols.  
 
5 
Sharing useful comprehension of the current 
situation and actions/action planning important for 
the collaboration.  
 
6 
Follow a standardized framework for 
communication to avoid useless information and 
information overload.  
 
3. Methodology   
 
The empirical foundation for this paper is a case 
study of a full-scale regional exercise involving multiple 
terror incidents in southern Norway. The exercise was 
designed to train the cooperation among stakeholders in 
the field, but each involved EMS also had several 
internal sub-goals to train. Multiple qualitative methods 
were used, combining observation, audio-log analysis 
and validation with stakeholders after the exercise to 
clarify vague results. Using the audio-log as a 
methodology for post-hoc analysis allows the actual 
communication combined with the event timeline to 
reveal the “live image” of the communication among the 
collaborating stakeholders. This serves as an important 
supplement to traditional retrospective interviews and 
textual analysis, and it addresses the need for detailed 
information being exchanged during emergency 
operations. 
 
3.1 Scenario  
 
The exercise involved three interrelated incidents 
occurring almost simultaneously. The scenario was built 
on a terror attack where a single terrorist hijacked a bus 
with 20 student passengers at a school a few kilometers 
from the city center. The situation developed and 
required a multi-agency operation involving the police, 
fire and health services. The bus was not stopped and 
drove away from the event site. About 10 minutes later 
a traffic accident with an unknown number of human 
injuries occurred in a harbor intersection. The police 
Command and Control Centre (CCC) then issued a 
triple-alert (alerting all involved CCCs in a conference 
phone call) and provided a common update on the new 
incident for building a common operational picture.  
Yet another incident was alerted after 5 minutes, 
from a public witness reporting that the hijacked bus had 
driven into a crowd attending an open concert by the 
waterfront of the city center. A large unknown number 
of people was injured both on land and in the water, 
creating a chaotic situation. The police CCC updated the 
fire and health services on the new incident and 
informed about the caller's perception of an intentional 
event (the act of terror). The police defined the situation 
as an ongoing life-threatening violence operation, which 
activates specific procedures for all agencies involved. 
Furthermore, this situation required the involvement of 
more organizations such as the Sea Rescue, the affected 
municipality, Volunteer organizations and the Civil 
Defence. An assembly place for injured and deceased 
was organized, and incident commanders for police, fire 
and health services were appointed. Evacuation of the 
area, the establishment of a next of kin center and 
communication with media were some of the important 
tasks that unfolded in the next 30 minutes of the 
exercise. The entire exercise had a timeframe of 
approximately 5 hours, with the active part lasting for 
about 3 hours. 
 
3.2 Observation  
 
The observation was carried out by two authors, 
whereby one was observing the work in a CCC and the 
other was present at the most resource-intensive 
emergency site. i.e. the last incident by the city center 
waterfront. In the CCC notes were taken while 
observing the operation as well as questions asked when 
something was perceived as unclear. It should be noted 
that the first author has practical experience from 
emergency dispatching and therefore holds some basic 
knowledge in this area. The on-site observation 
involved observing the different emergency personnel`s 
operation from a spot with a good overview, taking 
several pictures. Some questions were posed to the 
involved organizers and actors after the exercise both 
for collecting their opinions and to clarify uncertainties 
on the results. Stakeholders from all agencies provided 
comments.  
 
3.3 Audio-log from the inter-agency call group 
 
EMS in Norway are using the Norwegian Public 
Safety Network (NPSN) as a common platform for 
collaborative communication. The technology is built 
on the TETRA- standard (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio). 
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This infrastructure provides secure communication in 
coverage, capacity and voice quality. The NPSN gives 
the users an opportunity to communicate in call groups 
across agencies and geographical areas. The first 
responder agencies in Norway use the NPSN as a key 
tool in their daily operations. In this paper, the audio-log 
studied is an inter-agency call group reserved only for 
first responders, named BAPS (fire-police-acute 
medicine cooperation). Common regulations for using 
the NPSN [48] provides a set of guidelines for user 
identification signals, when different functionalities 
should be used, definitions related to the NPSN and 
plain-radio language checks for group communication. 
The guidelines for use of the NPSN [49] underpin the 
importance of regular user exercises to secure proper 
practice and utilization of the functionalities.  
The audio-log consists of communication between 
operative units and dispatchers from the police, fire and 
health (ambulance) services. The communication mainly 
originates from the following six actors; (1) Emergency 
dispatcher from Police CCC, (2) Emergency dispatcher 
from Fire CCC, (3) Emergency dispatcher from Health 
CCC (4) Incident Commander Coordination Point, Police 
officer, (5) Incident Commander Health/ ambulance 
personnel, (6) Incident Commander Fire and rescue 
services. Additionally, operative units from all mentioned 
services occasionally communicated in the inter-agency 
call group. There are other options for communication in 
the NPSN, for instance, the stakeholders can communicate 
in agency-internal call groups or in one-to-one 
conversations during the operation. The studied inter-
agency call-group functions as a collaboration channel for 
the first responders, and it is required for all actors in these 
agencies to continually listen to this group.  
The audio-log had several tracks, i.e. the recording 
of the communication was divided into several audio 
files in the record system and consisted of a total of 4,25 
hours. The tracks show the actual timeline with both 
silence and messages, and all tracks were transcribed to 
ensure the completeness of all messages. All sequences 
of the events were further reconstructed into a complete 
dataset and systematized with the following 
information; 1) the origin of the information; 2) the 
recipient of the information, and 3) the information 
content. The dataset was also triangulated with the real-
time logs documented by the police during the drill. The 
authors discussed and classified the messages into 
several categories (Table 2). The categorization used an 
inductive method and was developed gradually through 
classification and reclassification based on the content 
of the messages until a stable, unique category 
framework emerged. The process narrowed down the 
original 22 categories into 14 categories, as listed in 
Table 2. The categories aim to be sufficiently specific to 
reflect the content of the messages, but still also generic 
enough to to be used in other similar cases [50]. Some 
of the categories relate to the important features of a 
COP (Table 1), e.g., COP feature number 1, 2 and 3 in 
Table 1 are mirrored in the “Situation Report” and 
“Location” categories (Table 2) as the actors shared 
their SA and provided the collaborative agencies with 
important information from the operation and 
environment. The categories “Action”, “action plan” 
and “request” are related to feature number 5. Feature 4 
and 6 are related to “report barriers”, as different 
terminology and information overload can represent 
hindrances in the task execution. In brief, analyzing the 
features of a COP can be used for systematic learning 
after exercises, especially as provided by audio-log 
post-hoc analysis of real-time communication.  
 
Table 2: Communication Exchange Categories 
Categories Coverage 
Situation 
Reports 
Information flow that involves new and 
updated information regarding the 
emergency. 
Confirmation Statements that express the agencies’ 
acknowledgment (heard, known, 
understood) information or actions.  
Action Plan Statements which imply the agencies 
‘plan for action in order to respond to 
the current state. 
Request Request for updated information, 
resources or support 
Action Actions taken and reported in BAPS 
Location Providing or confirming a current 
location or being in a wrong location 
Contacting The actor tries to contact one or several 
actors  
No Answer When the addressed actor(s) did not 
reply to the contact request 
Offer 
resources 
When one agency offers resources 
relative to the situation 
New 
Emergency 
event 
Notifications on new emergency events 
relative to the operation 
Common 
Understanding  
Information on the situation and all 
involved agencies confirm that they 
have received and understood. 
Report 
barriers 
Reports of barriers when performing 
tasks, such as missing equipment or 
conflicts with other involved parties. 
Error Disruptions in the call group (such as 
human mistakes).  
Information 
Mismatch 
When actors have different SA in a 
specific situation.  
 
4. Results   
  
In this section, we present the results of our 
communication analysis. No actual contents of the 
Page 608
  
communication in the audio-logs are presented, to 
protect the stakeholder’s privacy.  
However, both the timeline and actual conversations 
have been documented, allowing us to trace back the 
actual messages. Some of the stakeholder’s comments 
are cited as validation for the results. It is necessary to 
consider several issues regarding these comments. For 
instance, each comment mirror one person’s opinion 
and is likely influenced by post-hoc rationalization [51].  
 
Figure 2 Information being exchanged by each 
agency (%) 
 
Figure 2 presents an overview of the percentage of 
categories exchanged by the agencies, whereas the total 
number of messages is 134. As can be seen, the figure 
depicts that ILKO and ILB (see table 3 explaining 
abbreviations) were the most active agencies, especially 
on communicating “action plan”, which was frequently 
followed by “confirmation” in a number of messages.  
 
Table 3: List of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description  
BAPS Fire, health – and police services inter-
agency call group 
ILKO Incident commander Point, Police officer 
ILB  Incident Commander, Fire and rescue 
personnel 
ILH Incident Commander, Health, ambulance 
personnel.  
LA14 Ambulance Helicopter 
POC Police Operative Car 
FROC Fire-and rescue Operative Car 
Ambulance Ambulance team 
CCC 110 Command and Control Center, Fire and 
rescue  
CCC 112 Command and Control Center, 
Police Services  
CCC 113 Command and Control Center, 
Health services  
NPSN Norwegian Public Safety Network  
 
These two organizations played a key role in 
reporting situations, especially ILKO. In this terror act 
case, the police have the superior responsibility of the 
operation. Thus, it is natural that they received most 
information from their CCC and took responsibility for 
building a COP. For ILB, this situation was resource-
intensive, requiring the mobilization of a truck (to stop 
an uncontrolled bus) and divers (for rescuing victims in 
the water). The ambulance personnel carried out the 
treatment of the victims and would “not spend much 
time on communication in BAPS” [stakeholder 
comment].  
To analyze the development of the inter-agency 
interactions when building the COP, we developed 
chord diagrams. The diagrams show the communication 
flow among the agencies, of which the chord runs from 
the originator agency to the recipient agency, 
furthermore, the more volume in the chord, the higher 
number of messages. Information categories being 
exchanged are presented as bar charts. The scenario 
guidelines and messages in the audio-log revealed that 
the crisis could be divided into three phases: the alert 
phase (when the three CCCs alerted the different 
response teams), the escalation phase (when the 
operative units are starting to comprehend the crisis), 
and response (when all involved agencies are managing 
the crisis).   
  
Figure 3 Multi-agency interactions (upper) 
and information being exchanged 
(bottom), 10:00-10:30 
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1. Alert phase (10:00-10:30) 
      In this phase the number of messages was at the highest 
with 88 messages being exchanged. ILKO and ILB 
communicated with each other with a considerable higher 
frequency than the other actors. But as the chord diagram 
shows, ILKO also addressed CCC 113 and CCC 110. 
ILKO was in charge of the operation and provided the 
others with critical information. ILB was also active. The 
fire and rescue services hold the responsibility for the 
operation until the police are on site. ILKO got updated 
information until the time they were present. 
There are several categories used in the alert phase; 
where “confirmation” represents 25% of the messages. 
As the bar chart presents, the messages are concerning 
several features regarding the agencies’ SA. The 
categories “action”, “action plan” and “location” are all 
representing an increasing SA based in the category 
“common understanding”, representing that information 
exchanged in the BAPS call group was confirmed and 
understood by all agencies. One could interpret this as if 
all agencies in this phase were on the alert and followed 
the procedure for confirming. 
The high percent of the category “confirmation” 
related to the confirmation that they heard and 
understood messages in the other categories. The 
“situation reports” would typically be communicated in 
the different internal-agency call groups which provide 
the agency-specific CCCs important information due to 
their profession.  
 
2. Escalated phase (10:30-11:00) 
       In this phase, the number of messages was 20. All 
the agencies were active in BAPS, but ILB was far more 
active than the rest (Figure 4). In this phase, the 
operative units on site prepared themselves on the most 
resource-intensive incident, and the fire and rescue 
services had many tasks concerning the victims in the 
water. At this time, they would need as much 
information as possible. The situation was chaotic, 
which could explain the high frequency of “requests” 
and “situation reports”. In practice, these types of 
messages contain requests of updated and/or more 
information, resources or support. We can also observe 
that the category “offer resources” is present, which 
implies that the stakeholders comprehended the 
situation.  Thus, they can anticipate that the situation 
required more resources than the current state. The lack 
of “confirmation” can be a result of the busy situation 
where the actors had a lot going on both on site and in 
other call groups. As one stakeholder characterized the 
situation; “Simply a mental overload” [Stakeholder]. 
 
 
 
3.  Response phase (11:00-13:00) 
      In this phase, the number of messages was 26. The 
actors were working with agency-specific tasks and 
started to get an overview of the situation. As this was 
an act of terror, the police had a major responsibility to 
make the situation safe for both the collaborative 
agencies and the civil people present at the emergency 
site. This can explain why ILKO stands for most of the 
communication in BAPS as can be observed in the chord 
diagram (Figure 5). The terrorist was not arrested yet in 
this phase. All communications were in the category 
“Situation Reports”. It shows that the use of BAPS is for 
building a COP by providing all agencies in the call 
group with information that is seen as common 
information needs. The lack of confirmation might have 
several reasons; firstly ILKO, ILB and ILH were all 
located at the assembly place for injured and deceased 
and did not need to use BAPS to confirm. They only 
used the call group for providing other actors with 
information. Secondly, the agencies might use the 
internal agency call groups for both communication and 
confirmation. Third, the actors were too busy handling 
the mass causalities for confirming.  
Ideally, the “situation reports” should be confirmed by 
all agencies in BAPS. The lack of this can be explained 
by the assumption that the messages are not as critical 
as in the previous phases. It might also be caused by the 
Figure 4 Multi-agency interactions 
(upper) and information being 
exchanged (bottom), 10:30-11:00 
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professional culture and needs more attention. As one 
actor stated after seeing the results; “Clearly we must 
repeat our messages when we don`t get confirmation” 
[Stakeholder].  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The results for all phases in the operation can provide 
an overall picture of the collaborative communication 
for building a COP. In the alert phase, a diversity of 
categories is being exchanged and the category 
“common understanding” shows that most of the 
information is understood by all stakeholders. It seems 
like the building of a COP is effective in the alert phase. 
The maintenance of the COP in the next phases 
(escalated and response phase) is less obvious. In the 
escalated phase, the situation was chaotic, and the 
stakeholders struggled to maintain a COP by using the 
category “request” most frequently. In the response 
phase, the stakeholders gained more control and 
provided each other with information. If this means that 
they maintained a COP is hard to conclude on, because 
of the absence of the “confirmation” category. This 
should ideally have been validated through retrospective 
interviews with stakeholder. Nevertheless, based on the 
observations, stakeholders’ comments and the 
messages` content, there is reason to believe that a COP 
was established in the two last phases. If the COP was 
absent, we assume the categories “request”, 
“contacting” and “information mismatch” would have 
been used to some extent.  
It is important to consider the fact that this is based 
on an exercise, which despite being planned to be as 
realistic as possible does not necessarily echo a real 
event. Exercises are fictitious and constructed and 
cannot provide the same effects as a real event, because 
of the participants’ awareness that it is not real [25]. 
Furthermore, this case was an act of terror with multiple 
incidents, which represents an extraordinary situation. 
Because of this, the communication in BAPS does not 
mirror an ordinary multi-agency emergency operation. 
Nevertheless, this case was used for developing the 
categories and a methodology to analyze COP which we 
argue can be reusable in other full-scale exercises and 
evaluation after real events. Several of the features of 
the COP (table 1) can be identified in the analysis. 
Firstly, different levels of SA within the agencies can be 
observed through the categories “common 
understanding”, “action” and “action plan”. These 
categories indicate the actors` perception of elements in 
the environment and that they comprehend the current 
status.  
The fact that these categories are frequently used in 
the alert phase can demonstrate that the agencies` 
communication embraces several important features of 
a COP. For instance, the actors create SA (feature 1) and 
by sharing information (feature 3 and 5) they depict 
knowledge on each other’s operational modus (feature 
2) in the alert phase of this exercise. In the escalated 
phase the situation appeared as chaotic, and the high 
frequency of the “request” category can show that the 
agencies know the others` capabilities (feature 2) and 
requests for information or some sort of action. The last 
phase clearly reveals communication of information that 
is assumed to be important for the collaborative 
agencies (feature 3 and 5) by offering each other 
“situation reports”. Regarding the harmonized 
terminology and standardized framework (feature 4 and 
6) post hoc analysis of audio-logs provide a good 
opportunity to investigate this, but in that case, it would 
be necessary to compare the communication to the 
standards being used. In this case study, these standards 
do not exist in any textual documents. To analyze this, 
interviews with key stakeholders had to be required.  
  The first responder agencies have pre-defined 
tasks and goals which means that the messages` content 
and purpose are relevant for several different operations 
and can therefore be reusable for different settings. The 
audio-logs from emergency operations provides access 
to the actual real-time communication during the 
operation including the timeline. This gives the 
opportunity to capture the detailed information being 
exchanged in different stages of the operation. The fact 
that the actors use other ways to communicate internally 
Figure 5 Multi-agency interactions (upper) and 
information being exchanged (bottom), 11:00-
13:00 
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in their associated agency and one-to-one conversations 
in the NPSN poses a challenge related to getting the 
whole picture. Even if the BAPS call group exists for 
collaborative communication, some of this information 
is then taking place outside this call group. Other 
imaginable limitations are the possibility of missing 
tracks in audio-logs, legal challenges related to getting 
access to audio-logs from real events and the nearly 
unavoidable requirement of the basic knowledge of this 
sort of emergency management operations. However, if 
the goal is to identify important features in one 
particular area, audio-logs provide real-time 
communication and the actual timeline in the operation. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
 
By using the important features for a COP, it is possible 
to evaluate the achievement and maintenance of COP 
during an emergency operation. The features are (1) 
Creation and maintenance of different levels of SA 
within the involved agencies (2) Knowledge of each 
other`s operational modus (3) Effective and time-
specific communication on important static and 
dynamic environmental features, shared elements and 
common critical cues (4) harmonized terminology (5) 
Sharing useful comprehension of the current situation 
and actions/action planning important for the 
collaboration, and (6) Follow a standardized framework 
for the communication. The categories developed in this 
case study aim to be reusable for post hoc analysis of the 
real-time communication related to establishing a COP 
in similar cases. We argue that this methodology can be 
an important supplement to textual reports and 
retrospective interviews for future evaluations of both 
full-scale exercises and real events.  
      The study`s findings may inspire stakeholders and 
other researchers to further investigate the important 
features of a COP in exercises and real events, and use 
audio-logs and categories of messages to elicit a 
dynamic development of a COP. Currently, this 
methodology will be validated further in different 
scenarios.  This can be achieved by applying the audio-
log analysis in other exercises as supplementation for 
other evaluation methods.  
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